Phoenix Center for Research Holds a Dialogue Session on the Aftermath of the Algiers Declaration for National Reconciliation

Dr. Salah Abdel Ati opened the session, welcoming the honored attendees and calling for an intensive discussion of the Algiers Declaration and its outcomes, with the aim of shedding light on what took place between the factions and the Algerian government, and the risks that emerged during the drafting of the reconciliation program — risks that reached the point of threatening to derail the reconciliation meeting, as a result of the deep disagreements between Fatah and Hamas over the formation of the national unity government and its political program.

This led the parties to strike this item from the reconciliation paper — so what points and headings for agreement remain? And do these points and headings constitute a practical entry point for reconciliation? But the more important question that we raise today for this workshop's dialogue is: what is new that the Algiers agreement brought compared to previous agreements? And what has changed in the texts and in the hearts?

These issues will be on the research agenda at our round table, and Dr. Salah Abdel Ati praised Algeria's role — leadership and people — in supporting the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian reconciliation process.

In this context, the attendees discussed the Algiers meeting and its resulting outcomes, both with regard to the course of the dialogue and the obstacles that punctuated it, and the mechanisms for resolving those obstacles and disagreements. The attendees also drew comparisons between the Algiers agreement and the previous agreements in Cairo, Gaza, and Beirut.

The participants concluded with the following issues and findings:

First: hosting or sponsoring reconciliation by any Arab or international party requires a Palestinian popular lever that exerts pressure on the two sides of the division, to push them to recognize the dangers arising from the state of division and its destructive impact on the Palestinian national cause in all its dimensions. This is especially true given that those gathered at the dialogue table agreed that the division is an Israeli will and an Israeli program. Moreover, some attendees considered the division to be the most important weapon in Israel's hand against the Palestinian people, on a par with the weapons of settlement, siege, and racism.

The participants also pointed to other difficulties that have piled up in Palestinian political life, obstructing reconciliation. Among the most prominent of these factors: the structural transformations that have affected the factions of national action, represented by the main shift that has struck the structure of the factions — the shift from a structure of resistance to a structure of authority — and the social, cultural, and political formations that followed these transformation processes. And what these formations produce in terms of a network of economic and political interests, which the state of division has produced. Likewise, this state has produced a violent conflict over claims to political representation, of which the Algiers meeting formed a part.

In this context, the attendees questioned the omission and removal of the item on the national unity government, which constitutes the entry point and the practical test of reconciliation. This government, which is supposed to be entrusted with overseeing and implementing the terms of the agreement, most notably: the item on comprehensive elections.

So who, and how, will oversee the elections that were agreed to be held within a year? This political shortcoming was skipped over and set aside, sacrificed on the altar of making the Algiers meeting a success, which turned this meeting into a mere quantitative addition to the reconciliation file, already burdened with agreements and meetings.

In this context, some attendees felt that the Algiers agreement, measured by its outcomes, amounts to nothing more than a courtesy meeting, and an agreement to save face for the State of Algeria, which is hosting the upcoming Arab summit. Both sides of the division are keen to strengthen their standing with the Algerian state. In this context, Hamas is considered the biggest winner from the Algiers meeting, both in terms of strengthening its relations with the State of Algeria, and in cementing itself as a fundamental and principal partner in Palestinian national decision-making and Palestinian political representation — Hamas, in this regard, is among the winners from the Algiers meeting.

In another direction, some attendees held that the issue of reconciliation, with all its files, is not worth all this effort, and should be bypassed in favor of a renewed struggle-based action within national contexts, far from the products of Oslo and its political legacy. This view rests on the premise that the development of events, and the renewal of forms of conflict, have practically bypassed the issue of reconciliation with its known files. This trend deepens its view by saying that "reconciliation is already achieved, through the state of conflict with the occupation in its various forms and diverse tools." This in itself establishes different trajectories from the reality of the division, which is managed by the two sides of the division, coupled with external, regional, and international backing.

This support takes many forms and names, some of it humanitarian and some of it political, and the political support falls between two great contradictory poles: the pole of security coordination between the Authority and Israel and its various branches, and the other pole, the pole of supporting and backing the resistance, and reconstruction and lifting the siege on Gaza.

Some attendees held that these two poles constitute the nerve of the division, and that they were absent from the discussion and the results of the Algiers dialogues. Accordingly, this trend held that we are facing a phase of managing the division, not eliminating the division. Those who draw this conclusion believe that managing the division constitutes a magic solution for both sides of the division and their supporters and allies, and that managing the division also constitutes a political given par excellence, for preserving the state of relative stability of the current situation, which allows both sides of the division to enjoy political advantages and the benefits of power, without pressure or disturbance.

However, the most important factor in this context is Israel's ability, as an occupying power, to control both sides, albeit with different tools, and to integrate both sides into its racist settlement project, by disabling the comprehensive struggle project of the Palestinian people, and turning it into issues of daily demands, livelihood and humanitarian.

The meeting concluded by noting that the Palestinian division is part of the prevailing Arab scene, which the Arab condition experiences at the level of the state and society, and this perhaps points to a state of parallel that the Arab nation is going through with regard to state- and society-building. The Arab state and its political system have failed to accomplish the twin tasks of development and liberation, and Arab society has failed to build the systems of modernity and democracy.

Prepared and Edited by

Mr. Nasser Elewa